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There are three major areas of inquiry into the meaning of "unin-
sured automobile" as used in standard insurance contracts: (1) the
positive definition of an uninsured automobile; (2) the exclusion sec-
tion; and (3) the definition of a hit-and-run automobile.
The Definition of "Uninsured Automobile"
The term "uninsured automobile" is defined in the 1963 Country-
wide Endorsement as:
an automobile with respect to the ownership, maintenance or
use of which there is, in at least the amounts specified by the
financial responsibility laws of the state in which the insured
automobile is principally garaged, no bodily injury liability bond
or insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident with
respect to any person or organization legally responsible for
the use of such automobile, or with respect to which there is
a bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy applicable at
the time of the accident but the company writing the same denies
coverage thereunder. ...
In order to understand the endorsement and why it is written in
those terms, it is necessary to consider the first Uninsured Motorist
Endorsement written in 1956. This endorsement classified an automo-
bile as "uninsured" when there was "no bodily injury liability bond
or insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident .... 2
The threshold determination before the uninsured motorist en-
dorsement can be considered is whether or not the vehicle involved
comes within the definition of the term used in the policy either as an
"automobile" or "motor vehicle." Some insurance companies have at-
tempted to avoid liability when faced with claims by insureds who were
injured in accidents with negligent, financially irresponsible persons
who were not driving automobiles, but some other type of vehicle.3 One
of the typical non-automobiles is the uninsured motorcycle. In New
York two cases have considered the term "automobile." In Witt v.
New Hampshire Ins. Co.,4 an accident occurred in the state of New
York. A passenger, injured on an uninsured motorcycle, was held to
be protected under an uninsured motorist endorsement covering his
own automobile. The court reasoned that the motorcycle was an un-
insured automobile under the New York statutory definition of motor
vehicles, as to accidents occurring in New York.5
In Askey v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp.2 the
1 1963 Countrywide Endorsement § (c) (1).
2 1956 Countrywide Endorsement § (c) (1).3 See Rosenbaum v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 432 S.W.2d 45 (Ky. App.
1968), in which a horse-drawn carriage was determined not to be an auto-
mobile.
4 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968 reported in N.Y. Law J., 2/2/68 at p. 21, cl 8.
5 N.Y. INs. CoDE. § 601 subd. a (Supp. 1968)654 Misc. 2d 63, 281 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1967).
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accident occurred in Canada. and the lower court held that the motor-
cycle was not an uninsured automobile because the New York statute
applied only to an accident occurring in New York. The Appellate
Division, however, reversed the decision 7 because "the denial of lia-
bility because the accident occurred in Canada runs contrary to the
recent conceptual determinations of this question." s
Generally, the courts have concluded that regardless of the term
used in the endorsement, the insurer ought not to be allowed to restrict
coverage in this way. These decisions are usually based on the ap-
plicable uninsured motorist statute of the state which generally uses
the term "uninsured motor vehicle." The courts have reasoned that
insurers are required to provide coverage for injuries resulting from
an accident with any uninsured highway vehicle, including motorcycles.9
A Wisconsin case'0 has come to a different conclusion. In that case
the plaintiff, defendant and insurer were all residents of Iowa, and Iowa
law was applied in order to determine the question of whether or not
a motorcycle is an uninsured automobile. The court relied on the Iowa
case of Westerhausen v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co.3" and held that a mo-
torcycle was not an automobile. In Westerhausen the court was inter-
preting the definition of automobile in the liability section of the policy.
The policy had defined an automobile as a four wheeled vehicle. The
Wisconsin court said it would be inconsistent to apply a different
definition to an automobile in the Uninsured Motorist section than the
court in Iowa had applied to the liability section. Therefore, it was
held that under Iowa law a motorcycle was not an uninsured motor
vehicle. If the Wisconsin court had applied Wisconsin law the result
might have been different. The Wisconsin Statute Section 204.30(5)
relating to uninsured motorist coverage uses the term "motor vehicle"
instead of automobile. It seems that the use of the term motor vehicle
will bring a motorcycle within the definition of an uninsured motor
vehicle. Most insurance policies are now using the term motor vehicle
instead of automobile. One writer in the field of uninsured motorist
coverage has suggested that it seems justifiable and reasonable to ex-
tend coverage-even in the face of explicit policy language purporting
to restrict coverage to damages caused by an uninsured automobile-
since it is clear that the hazard created by the uninsured motorcycle
is exactly the same as that created by the uninsured automobile. 12
730 App. Div.'2d 632, 290 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1968).
8 Id. at 633, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 761.
9 See Voris v. Pacific Indem. Co., 213 Cal. App. 2d 29, 28 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1963).
In this case the California statute used the term motor vehicle instead of
automobile. The court held that the term motor vehicle was broader than
the term automobile.
10 Spain v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., Circuit Court of Dane County (1968).
11258 Ia. 969, 140 N.W.2d 719 (1966).
12 A. WiDiss, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MoTORIST COVERAGE, § 2.30 at 61 (1969).
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After it has been determined that the vehicle involved was within
the class insured, it is necessary to determine whether there is .. . no
bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy applicable ... -13 When
making this determination consideration must be given not only to
whether or not the driver of the motor vehicle has insurance, but also
to whether or not the owner of the vehicle has insurance.
There may be instances where a vehicle though covered by a lia-
bility insurance policy may be held to be uninsured. This generally
arises in a situation where the policy does not provide protection for,
or expressly excludes coverage of the injury. The case of Whitney v.
American Fidelity14 is a very good example of such a situation. A
vehicle in which the insured was a guest passenger was in an accident.
The vehicle was only covered by compulsory motor vehicle liability
insurance, which provided no coverage for injuries to guests. The
court held that the vehicle in which the insured was riding was an
uninsured motor vehicle. The court said that a vehicle carrying only
compulsory insurance could arguably be said not to have any insurance
applicable at the time of the accident. The court gave the word "ap-
plicable" the definition "capable of being applied."
There are other situations in which, although the vehicle is insured,
there is no insurance applicable, such as: where a vehicle is owned
by an employer whose liability policy excludes from the insureds there-
under any employee of the owner with respect to an injury to a fellow
employee,15 where the insured is injured while a passenger in his own
vehicle,16 where there are non-permissive users,'7 and where the vehicle
is driven by an unlicensed driver' or a thief. 9
On the other hand, the exclusion of intentional injury under a lia-
bility policy does not render a vehicle uninsured. In McCarthy v.
MVAIC20 a woman was injured when her brother-in-law intentionally
collided with her. The brother-in-law's automobile liability policy did
not cover that type of situation so she made claim under her uninsured
motorist endorsement. The court held that she was not involved in
an accident with an uninsured vehicle. The insurance policy was held
13 Supra, note 1.
14350 Mass. 542, 215 N.E.2d 765 (1966).
I5 Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Kellam, 207 Va. 736, 152 S.E.2d 287 (1967).
16 Bowsher v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 244 Ore. 549, 419 P.2d 606 (1966).
It should be noted that many uninsured motorist endorsements also provide
that any vehicle owned by the named insured cannot be an uninsured motor
vehicle. This will be discussed later in the exclusion section of this paper.
1 Application of Traveler's Indem. Co., 235 N.Y.S.2d 718, aff'd 20 App. Div. 2d
684, 246 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (1962). See also, Buck v. United States Fid. & Guar.
Co., 265 N.C. 285, 144 S.E.2d 34 (1965); Grange Ins. Assn. v. Eschback, 1
Wash. App. 230, 460 P.2d 690 (1969).
's Garcia v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 196 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1967). See also,
United States Fid. & Guar. v. Byrum, 208 Va. 815, 146 S.E.2d 246 (1966);
Carroll v. Preferred Risk Ins. Co., 34 Ill. 2d 310, 215 N.E.2d 801 (1966).
19 Gary v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 251 S.C. 530, 164 S.E.2d 213 (1968).
2016 App. Div. 2d 35, 224 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1962).
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to be perfectly valid and in force at the time of the accident. The court
said that this was not within the risk covered by the brother's policy
nor was the injury caused by an accident.
There are also cases where an insurer denies liability on a policy
in force at the time of the accident. Denial of liability may result from
failure to report the accident or failure to cooperate. The injured party
is then faced with a tortfeasor who has become financially irresponsible
following the accident even though he had insurance at the time of
the accident.
In 1958 the case of Matter of Berman (Travelers Indem. Co.) 2'
raised the issue that the uninsured motorist endorsement applies only
where there is no insurance applicable at the time of the accident. The
insurer argued that since a policy was applicable at the time of the
accident the later denial of coverage did not put the injured party
within the uninsured motorist provision. The court, literally construing
the definition of an uninsured motor vehicle, held that such a denial
of coverage following an accident did not make the tortfeasor's auto-
mobile an uninsured automobile. In 1966, this decision was overruled
by the New York Court of Appeals in the Matter of Vanguard Ins. Co.
v. Polchlopek,22 where the court held that even though the uninsured
motorist endorsement did not provide for a situation in which the in-
surer disclaims liability, Section 167(subd. 2-a) of the New York In-
surance Law23 included such a situation in its definition of uninsured
automobile. The court relied heavily on this statutory definition al-
though admitting that it was not controlling because this was a con-
tractual matter. The court also reasoned that public policy, being the
protection of motorists injured by financially irresponsible people, could
best be served by endorsement holding that an insurance policy dis-
claimed subsequent to the accident is insurance "not applicable at the
time of the accident." 24
In order to avoid the problem in the Matter of Berman several
states adopted a statutory provision requiring that the uninsured mo-
torist endorsement must provide indemnification in instances involving
a denial of coverage by an offending motorist's liability insurer.2 5 The
21 1 Misc. 2d 291, 171 N.Y.S.2d 869 (1958). This case was decided under the
1956 Countrywide Endorsement. See also, Rosen v. United States Fid. &
Guar., 23 App. Div. 2d 335, 260 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1968); But cf. McDaniel v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 815, 139 S.E.2d 816 (1965).
22 18 N.Y.2d 376, 222 N.E.2d 383, 275 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1966).
23 N.Y. INS. LAW. § 167 (Supp. 1968).
24 See Justice Valente's dissent in Rosen v. United States Fid. & Guar., 23 App.
Div. 2d 335, 260 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1968), from which the Vanguard reasoning
is adopted. See also, Carroll v. Preferred Risk Ins. Co., 34 Ill. 2d 310, 215
N.E.2d 801 (1966) ; Comment, Uninsured Motorist Insurance Coverage in the
Event of Subsequent Insolvency or Denial of Liability by Tortefeasor's In-
surer, 20 ALA. L. REv. 123, 126 (1967).
25 CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(b) (Deering 1963) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.0851(2)
(1966); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-407.1(b) (Supp. 1966); Ky. REv. STAT. § 304.682
*"1970]
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Countrywide Endorsment was then revised and the clause ". . . but
the company writing the same denies coverage thereunder .... "26 was
added.
The addition of the above clause to the endorsement does not solve
the problem completely; in fact, it even creates some other problems.
Many insurance companies feel that the uninsured motorist coverage
should not apply where the disclaimer of coverage by the primary in-
surance company was false and tendered in bad faith. The argument
has not found much favor with the courts. In St. Paul Mercury Ins.
Co. v. American Arbitration Ass., 27 an allegation that the decision of
the company to disclaim liability was false and tendered in bad faith
was held not to relieve the company obligated on an uninsured motorist
endorsement. The reasoning was that the denial of coverage, whether
it was made for a valid reason or not, was such a denial of coverage
as would satisfy the requirement of the endorsement. This view also
was takes in a number of New York rulings.2 s But in 1965, the New
York Court of Appeals made a pronouncement on the disclaimer clause.
In MVAIC v. Malone,29 the court held that:
a unilateral declaration of non-coverage by the insurer of
an alleged tortfeasor did not ipso facto and without judicial
investigation satisfy the requirement ...that alleged tortfeasor
must have been uninsured, and MVAIC had opportunity ... to
litigate before the court .... the question whether alleged tort-
feasor's policy was validly cancelled. 30
This reasoning was followed in other New York cases. 31 It seems
that in New York it will be necessary for the person seeking to recover
for injuries, caused by a motorist whose liability insurer later denies
liability, to show the validity of the disclaimer. Perhaps the reason for
these holdings is that the MVAIC is a quasi-public corporation and
the courts are reluctant to rule against it.
The real key to how the courts will construe the disclaimer pro-
vision seems to be whether or not they consider the language am-
(2) (Supp. 1967) ; LA. REv. STAT. tit. 22 § 1406 (D) (2) (Supp. 1966) ; Miss.
CODE ANN. § 8285-52 (Supp. 1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20.279.21(f) (Supp.
1966) ; S.C. CODE § 46.750.31(3) (Supp. 1966) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-381(c)(Supp. 1966); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-31 (c) (Supp. 1967). See also Mc-
Daniel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 815, 139 S.E.2d 806 (1965).26 1956 Countrywide Endorsement.
27425 Pa. 548, 229 A.2d 858 (1967).
28MVAIC v. Marera, 31 Misc. 2d 51, 219 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1961) ; Matter of
MVAIC (Holley), 33 Misc. 2d 567, 227 N.Y.S.2d 864 (1962); Kaiser v.
MVAIC, 35 Misc. 2d 636, 231 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1962); MVAIC v. Steen, 22
App. Div. 2d 697, 253 N.Y.S.2d 908 (1964) ; Riviera v. MVAIC, 22 App. Div.
2d 201, 254 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1964). See generally, 26 A.L.R.3d 883.
2916 N.Y.2d 1027, 213 N.E.2d 316, 265 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1965). See also H. Hente-
mann, Uninsured Motorist Defined, 16 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 504, 510 (1967).
30 265 N.Y.S.2d at 907, 213 N.E.2d at 317.
31 McGuane v. MVAIC, 29 App. Div. 2d 835, 287 N.Y.S.2d 861 (1968); Gon-
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biguous. If they find an ambiguity they will hold against the insurer
and in favor of the injured insured.
Another problem which arises in regard to the disclaimer provision
is the amount of evidence needed to show that the other motorist's
insurer has denied coverage and that the tortfeasor is an uninsured
motorist. For example, in Page v. Insurance Co. of North America,32
allegations that the insurer of the other motorist refused plaintiff's
written claim were held not to satisfy the necessary evidentiary require-
ments. The court noted that coverage and claim are not synonymous
since it is common knowledge that an insurer will often deny a claim
even though coverage may eventually be afforded. In such a situation,
the insurance company which paid the claim under the uninsured motor-
ist endorsement will always retain subrogation rights against the com-
pany which denied liability.33
Insolvency of the insurance company raises interesting problems
with respect to the uninsured motorist endorsement. The 1956 Coun-
trywide Endorsement 34 makes it apparent that the endorsement does not
provide protection to an insured who is in an accident with a tortfeasor
who has insurance in existence at the time of the accident but whose
insurance company thereafter is unable to provide coverage because of
its insolvency. There is a diversity of opinion as to whether or not
insolvency of the tortfeasor's insurance company is sufficient to put
the insured within the uninsured motorist endorsement. The decision
usually depends on the type of insurance policy applicable at the time
of the accident. Therefore, it will be necessary to discuss the cases in
terms of the policy provisions.
A. Policy only requiring no insurance applicable at the time of
the accident.
Courts have in many instances given a literal construction to this
clause and have refused to consider the situation of a subsequent in-
solvent insurer. In Apotas v. Allstate Ins. Co.35 the court found that
the phrase was clear and unambiguous, therefore precluding any con-
struction of the clause against the insurer. The court held that the sub-
sequent insolvency did not affect or change the fact that there was in-
surance applicable at the time of the accident. Another court has held
that to construe the clause any other way would be in effect a rewriting
of the contract and the addition of a provision which did not previ-
zalez v. MVAIC, 48 Misc. 2d 958, 266 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1966); MVAIC v.
National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 26 App. Div. 2d 6, 270 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1966).32256 Cal. App. 2d 374, 64 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1967). See Application of DiStefano,
34 Misc. 2d 68, 228 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1962) ; Riveira v. MVAIC, 22 App. Div. 2d
201, 254 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1964); Gonzalez v. MVAIC, 48 Misc. 2d 958, 266
N.Y.S.2d 640 (1966).
33 Central Mut. Ins. Co. v. Espina, 208 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1962).
34 Section (c) (1).
35246 A.2d 923 (Del. 1968).
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ously existA6 In Dreher v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.,37 a motorist
was held not to be within the uninsured provision because of the sub-
sequent insolvency of the tortfeasor's insurer. At the time of this de-
cision the Illinois Legislature was considering whether or not to extend
coverage under such a circumstance. The court, while acknowledging
the pending legislation and the policy of liberally construing the in-
surance contract in favor of the insured, declined to allow the claim.
The court said that the policy was not ambiguous and that there was
no compelling public policy which required them to extend coverage.
B. Denial of Coverage Clause.
In many instances a statute" or a policy definition39 may render a
vehicle uninsured where the insurer denies coverage. There seems to
be a split of authority over whether or not the subsequent insolvency
of the insurer can be said to be a denial of coverage. States which
have in their statutory definition of an uninsured motorist the denial
of coverage clause generally hold that the subsequent insolvency of the
insurer is a denial of coverage. This result has been reached in the
states of Virginia,40 South Carolina,41 California 42 and New York.43
However, some courts feel that even though the statutory definition
may include a denial of coverage clause, the status of the coverage
will not be affected by the subsequent insolvency of the insurer. In
Michigan Mut. Liability Co. v. Pokerzuinski,44 the court held that the
term "denies coverage" carried an affirmative connotation, such as
rejection of a policyholder as an insured or a defense that the policy
did not cover a particular accident, and that, while the result may be
the same, the court would not twist the terms used.4 5
In states which do not have a statutory definition of uninsured mo-
torist, or have a definition which does not contain a denial of coverage
36Topolewski v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exchange, 6 Mich. App. 286, 148
N.W.2d 906 (1967). See also Federal Ins. Co. v. Speight, 220 F. Supp. 90
(D.C. S.C. 1963); Rousso v Michigan Educational Employees Mut Ins. Co.,
6 Mich. App. 444, 149 N.W.2d 204 (1967); Swargin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 399
S.W.2d 131 (Co. 1966); Bollinger v. Traveler's Indem. Co., 433 S.D.2d 55
(Mo. 1968); Hardin v. American Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 261 N.C. 67, 134 S.E.2d
142 (1964); Rice v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 267 N.C. 421, 148 S.E.2d 223(1966) ; Stone v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 55 Tenn. App. 189, 397 S.W.2d 411
(1962).
37 83 Ill. App. 2d 141, 226 N.E.2d 287 (1967).
38 Supra, note 25.
39 Supra, note 1.
40 State Farm. Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brower, 204 Va. 887, 134 S.E.2d 277 (1964).
41 North River Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 244 S.C. 393, 137 S.E.2d 264 (1964).
42 Katz v. American Motorist Ins. Co., 244 Cal. App. 2d 886, 53 Cal. Rptr. 669
(1966); Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Diskin, 255 Cal. App. 2d 502, 63 Cal. Rptr. 177
(1967).
43 Bendelow v. Traveler's Indem. Co., 57 Misc. 2d 327, 293 N.Y.S.2d 629 (1968).
44 8 Mich. App. 475, 154 N.W.2d 609 (1967).
45 See Seabough v. Sisk, 413 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. App. 1967) where the court held
that to "deny coverage" was to mean some positive act, more than insolvency
without any denial of liability. The court held that insolvency was not a
denial of liability nor a denial of coverage but instead a breach of contract.
See also Uline v. MVAIC, 28 Misc.2d 1002, 213 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1961).
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clause, one must rely on the policy. Therefore, in Illinois Ins. Co. v.
Rose48 the court was faced with a situation similar to Dreher 7 al-
though in this case there was a denial of coverage clause in the policy.
The court applied the rationale of Pattani v. Keystone Insurance Co.4s
and held that the subsequent insolvency of the insurer was a denial of
coverage. Pattani was decided without the benefit of any statutory
definition of an uninsured motorist. The court reasoned that even
though Pennsylvania did not have a statutory definition, the definition
of an uninsured motorist in the policy was similar to statutory pro-
visions in other jurisdictions which have held that in such situations
the vehicle was uninsured.
49
Whether or not the case is decided with the aid of a statute or by
interpretation of the policy provision, it seems that, if the basic phi-
losophy of uninsured motorist coverage is to protect against the finan-
cially irresponsible, coverage should be extended in all instances when
the tortfeasor is deprived of his insurance for whatever reason.
C. The Insolvency Provision
In order to overcome the problems raised by the subsequent in-
solvency of the insurer many states have passed statutes which require
insurance policies to contain a provision which extends coverage in
the event of insolvency.50 A question has been raised as to the time
within which the insolvency must occur in order for the coverage to
apply.5
1
There may be instances where the tortfeasor has insurance but in
an amount smaller than the amount of the uninsured motorist endorse-
ment under which the insured claims. This usually arises where the
tortfeasor has insurance which satisfies the financial responsibility
46 93 Ill. App. 2d 461, 235 N.E.2d 675 (1968).
47 83 Ill. App. 2d 141,226 N.E.2d 287 (1967).
48 426 Pa. 332, 231 A.2d 402 (1967). See also Levy v. Keystone Ins. Co., 426 Pa.
340, 231 A.2d 406 (1967) ; but cf. Farkas v. Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co.,
Minn. _ 173 N.W.2d 21 (1969) where there was a denial of
coverage clause which the court refused to interpret to cover a post accident
insolvency.
49 Id. at 336, 231 A.2d at 405. See also Stephens v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 182
Neb. 562, 156 N.W.2d 123 (1968). In that case the court held that since the
phrase "denies coverage" was that of the insurer it was open to construction
if ambiguous. The court reasoned that a reasonable person could well have
understood the phrase "denies coverage" to mean a failure to meet the lia-
bility of the insured tortfeasor. It did not matter if it was a voluntary denial
of coverage or an involuntary denial as in the case where the insurer be-
comes insolvent. Accord: McCaffrey v. St. Paul Fire & Machine Ins. Co., 108
N.H. 373, 236 A.2d 490 (1967) ; Griffin v. Government Employee Ins.,
Nev. ,464 P.2d 502 (1970).
50 See Appendix A. In some cases the question of retroactivity of these statutes
has been raised. The courts generally apply them prospectively only and
therefore determine coverage on some other ground. See e.g., Dreher v. Aetna
Cas. and Sur. Co., 83 Ill. App. 2d 141, 226 N.E.2d 287 (1967); Illinois Ins.
Co. v. Rose, 93 Ill. App. 2d 461, 235 N.E.2d 675 (1968) ; Farkas v. Hartford
Acc. and Indem. Co., - Minn. , 173 N.W.2d 21 (1969)




requirement of a state which has a lower standard than the state in
which the insured resides. 52 In Taylor v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins.
Co.,5 3 an out of state automobile did not carry sufficient insurance to
satisfy the California responsibility law. The vehicle did, however,
carry sufficient insurance to comply with the requirements of the state
in which his motor vehicle was principally garaged. The court held
that the automobile would be considered an uninsured vehicle in Cali-
fornia to the extent of the difference between the tortfeasor's policy
limits and the minimum financial responsibility law of California.5 4
One case has carried this one step further. In White v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co.,55 the insured, a Virginia resident, was involved in an
accident with a Tennessee resident. In Virginia the Financial Responsi-
bility Act requires a minimum of $15,000 per person. The Tennessee
driver had only $10,000 coverage per person. A $22,000 judgment was
rendered against the Tennessee driver. The Virginia driver sued his
insurer and the defendant's insurer for the judgment. The defendant's
insurer paid $10,000, and the Virginia resident demanded $12,000 from
his insurer under his uninsured motorist provision. The Federal Dis-
trict Court stated that, since the tortfeasor did not have limits sufficient
to meet the Virginia Financial Responsibility Law, the injured party
was entitled to recover from his insurer.
The insurer argued that its liability should only be for the $5,000
difference between the tortfeasor's insurance and Virginia's Financial
Responsibility minimum. The insured argued he was entitled to $12,000.
The Federal Court held that the total amount of the uninsured motorist
policy was available to satisfy the judgment. The court applied the
rationale of Bryant v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.,5 6 which had re-
lied on the Virginia statutory scheme which allows an injured passenger
to collect under both his own uninsured motorist endorsement and that
of the driver's uninsured motorist endorsement.57
These decisions caused the 1956 Countywide Endorsement to be
amended and the clause ". . . in at least the amount specified by the
52 See Appendix A for the variations in policy limitations.
5 225 Cal. App. 2d 80, 37 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1964).
54See also, Calhoun v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 254 Cal. App. 2d 407,
62 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1967). Accord: Stevens v. American Service Mut. Ins. Co.,
234 A.2d 305 (D.C. 1967), (where the policy limits were $20,000 and the
financial responsibility requirement was $30,000, the motorist was held
uninsured to the extent of $10,000) ; Carrigan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 108 N.H.
131, 229 A.2d 179 (1967), (the court said that there was no rational dif-
ference or distinction between a partially insured and a totally uninsured
motorist. In either case there is not the required insurance under the Finan-
cial Responsibility Law); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fusco, 223 A.2d 447 (R.I.
1966) ; Cruzado v. Underwood, 39 Misc. 2d 859, 242 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1968).
55245 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Va. 1965).
56 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965).




financial responsibility law of the state in which the insured highway
vehicle is principally garaged . . .,,.8 was added.
The problem which still exists where the injured party has unin-
sured motorist coverage in excess of the statutory minimum59 but the
tortfeasor only has minimum insurance. Several courts have not al-
lowed recovery in such a situation.60 One court said that since the
torifeasor had the statutory minimum coverage the injured party was
not injured by an uninsured motorist, and that the policy was intended
to protect those injured by an uninsured motorist and not an "under-
insured motorist."61
It should be remembered that the policy limits are those of the
principal place of garaging and not the place of the accident. Therefore,
if the insured is involved in an accident with an uninsured motorist
in a state which has higher limits than the insured's state, he is limited
to the amount in his policy, and his insurer is not obligated to pay the
minimum amount prescribed in the state where the accident occurred.
The Exclusion Section
An intricate part of the definition of the uninsured automobile is
the section which defines what an uninsured automobile shall not in-
clude:
(1) an insured automobile or an automobile furnished for
the regular use of the named insured or a relative,
(2) an automobile or trailer owned or operated by a self-
insurer within the meaning of any motor vehicle finan-
cial responsibility law, motor carrier law, or any similar
law,
(3) an automobile or trailer owned by the United States of
America, Canada, a state, a political subdivision of any
such government or an agency of any of the foregoing,
(4) a land motor vehicle or trailer if operated on rails or
crawler-treads or while located for use as a residence
or premises not as a vehicle, or
(5) a farm type tractor or equipment designed for use prin-
5-The following states specifically adopted legislation defining an uninsured
vehicle as one which does not have bodily injury insurance or a bond in
the minimum amount specified at the time of the accident by the Financial
Responsibility Laws of the state:
ARK. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-4003 (Supp. 1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.0851
(Supp. 1966); GA. STAT. ANN. § 56-407.1 (1966); Ky. REV. STAT. § 304.682(2)
(Supp. 1967) ; LA. REV. STAT. tit. 22 § 1406 (Supp. 1966) ; MIss. CoDE ANN.
§ 8205-51 (Supp. 1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20.279.21(b) (3) (Supp. 1967).
S.C. CODE § 46-702(7) (Supp. 1966); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-381(b) (Supp.
1968) ; W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31 (Supp. 1968).
Two states still reflect the language of the 1956 Countrywide Endorsement:
CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(b) and N.Y. INs. LAWs § 167 (McKinney 1966).
59 Two states, Oklahoma and Virginia, allow coverage to be written above the
requirements of the Financial Responsibility Laws.
6o Smiley v. Estate of Toney, 100 Ill. App. 2d 271, 241 N.E.2d 116 (1968).
61 Detrick v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 158 N.W.2d 99 (Iowa 1968).
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cipally off public roads, except while actually on public
roads.6 2
Exclusion (1) operates when the insured63 is a passenger in the
insured automobile and an uninsured person is driving the vehicle. The
insured automobile may become an uninsured automobile for various
reasons: (1) there may be a "Family Exclusion" in the liability section
of the policy ;64 (2) the insurer may deny coverage under the liability
section for various reasons, i.e., lack of notice, lack of cooperation, etc.;
(3) the company may become insolvent.
There are few cases which interpret this exclusion section and they
show a split of authority as to its validity.
In Barras v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.6 5 the insured was a
passenger in her own car driven by an uninsured driver. An accident
occurred and the insured was injured. The "family exclusion" clause
barred the insured from coverage under the liability section. The in-
sured brought a declaratory judgment action against her insurer to
have the uninsured motorist provision declared applicable. The court
held that the exclusion of the insured automobile was valid. The court
relied on the Georgia statute,", which defines an uninsured automobile
as a motor vehicle, other than a motor vehicle owned by the named
insured. The court reasoned that since the statute and policy were con-
sistent the exclusion was valid.6 7
An interesting situation arose in Hale v. State Farm Mu"t.65 The
insurer had issued two automobile liability policies to Mr. and Mrs.
Hale. One policy covered a Comet owned jointly by them while the
other covered a Metro owned solely by Mrs. Hale. While Mr. Hale
was driving the Comet and Mrs. Hale was driving the Metro, they
collided.
Mrs. Hale sued Mr. Hale and the insurer refused to defend because
the policy issued on the Comet excluded "bodily injury to the insured
or a member of the same family." Mrs. Hale then instituted a claim
62 1963 Countrywide Endorsement (c) (2).
63 1963 Countrywide Endorsement
(a) "Insured" means:(1) the named insured as stated in the policy . . . and any person
designated as named insured in the schedule and, while residents
of the same household, the spouse of any such named insured
and relatives of either;(2) any other person while occupying an insured automobile; and(3) any person, with respect to damages he is entitled to recover
because of bodily injury....
64 It should be noted that some states statutorily prohibit the "Family Exclu-
sion" clause.65 118 Ga. App. 348, 163 S.E.2d 759 (1968).6 6 GA. CODE ANN. § 56407.1 (b).
67 See also Lofberg v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 68 Cal. Rptr. 541, 70 Cal. Rptr.
269 (on rehearing) (1968).6s 256 Cal. App. 2d 177, 63 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1967).
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under the uninsured motorist endorsement issued on her Metro. The
insurer denied coverage, contending that exclusion number (1) de-
prived Mrs. Hale of coverage. The court held the exclusion valid be-
cause Mrs. Hale was the owner of the Comet, which was "an automo-
bile furnished for the regular use of the named insured" and therefore
could be excluded as insured automobile.
However, in Murphy v. Criterion Ins. Co.69 Murphy was a passen-
ger in an automobile owned and operated by Weiner and insured by
Criterion. Murphy sustained injuries in a one car accident. Criterion
denied coverage under the liability section because of late notice.
Murphy instituted action under Weiner's uninsured motorist endorse-
ment. The company invoked Exclusion (1), but the court held that
Murphy was an insured and entitled to coverage under the uninsured
provision. The court stated that:
Notwithstanding express exclusions from the definition of
"uninsured automobile" contained in the endorsement, it has
been stated that . . 'a disclaimer or denial of liability by an
insurance company may place the automobile in the position of
an insured automobile, . . . if, but only if, the effect of the dis-
claimer or denial is to deprive the injured person of the protec-
tion afforded by a standard automobile policy ... '
With respect to the apparent inconsistencies in the definition
sections of the endorsement . . . the courts will give to the
language a construction most favorable to the insured (Murphy),
and one which results in coverage rather than denial of cover-
age.7 0
The court concluded that the uninsured endorsement existed inde-
pendently and apart from the policy to which it was annexed and re-
mained viable even though the principal policy was rendered unenforce-
able by reason of a disclaimer.
The reasons for the exclusion are justifiable where the named in-
sured is the injured party, but where a person classified as an insured
under the definition of persons insured7' is injured, it seems that New
York has the better view. No action by the operator of a vehicle should
deprive the claimant of his rights, and if the insurance carrier disclaims
liability because of an act or failure to act on the part of the owner, or
because of the insolvency of the insurer, the passenger should remain
an "insured" and not be affected by the exclusion.72
Exclusion (2)-self-insurer . . . is a justifiable exclusion because
there is in fact insurance applicable at the time of the accident. But
the problem arises when the self-insurer can't respond to a claim which
he is obligated to pay. In these situations it seems logical that the courts
6957 Misc. 2d 52, 293 N.Y.S.2d 851 (1968).
70 Id. at 54, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 853.
71Supra note 63.2 Garcia v. MVAIC, 41 Misc.2d 585, 589, 246 N.Y.S.2d 841, 843 (1964).
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will treat -this as an insolvency. Thus, according to case or statutory
requirements as to insolvency the uninsured motorist provision should
provide coverage.
Exclusion (3) is a justifiable exclusion for basically the same rea-
sons which apply to the self-insurer. The governmental agencies and
entities so excluded are usually capable of responding to claims against
them. However, in states which still have the doctrine of sovereign
immunity the insured is precluded from recovery from either the gov-
ernmental entity or his insurer. Professor Widiss has suggested that:
It seems to this writer that a more realistic approach would be
to alter the endorsement so as to provide coverage in accidents
with vehicles owned by government bodies when indemnification
is unavailable from such government body, either because it is
immune from suit, because its liability is limited or because it
does not possess adequate resources. 73
One case74 has held such an exclusion void. The action arose in
Arkansas which at the time of the accident followed the doctrine of
governmental immunity. The court held that under the Arkansas unin-
sured motorist statutory scheme, the purpose was to provide a basic
minimum coverage against the uninsured motorist and the exclusion
could not abrogate the statutory requirement. The Federal District
Court stated that:
The obvious intent of the Legislature in enacting the Unin-
sured Motorist Act was to provide insurance to policyholders
such as plaintiff . . . against compensation for injuries in a
collision with an uninsured motor vehicle at least to the extent
provided by the statute....
... . (If this provision) .. . (is) held valid the purpose of
the Arkansas statute, which is to provide a basic minimum cov-
erage against the financially irresponsible motorist, would be
frustrated. This basic coverage may not be abrogated nor
diminished by the small print in an insurance contract.
7 5
Exclusions (4) and (5) have both been held valid because the ve-
hicles excluded are not normally considered as automobiles or motor
vehicles under the definition supplied by the Legislature. In Woods v.
Progressive Mut. Ins.78 an automobile liability insurance policy excluded
a land motor vehicle or trailer if operated on rails or crawler treads,
but the court held that this exclusion did not bar recovery for the
death of the insured's daughter-passenger when his vehicle was in-
volved in a collision with an uninsured bulldozer propelled and operated
on crawler treads. Since the bulldozer was "a self-propelled device in,
73 A. WIDISs, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE, § 2.47 at p. 93 (1969).
74 Vaught v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 413 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1969).
75 Id. at 541. (Quoting the Federal District Court at 283 F. Supp. 384, 388, 390
(E.D. Ark. 1968).
76 15 Mich. App. 335, 166 N.W.2d 613 (1969).
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upon or by which any person was or might be transported upon a
highway," the bulldozer was a motor vehicle within the definition of
the Michigan Motor Vehicle Law, the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims
Act and the Insurance Code.
The Hit-and-Run Automobile
The final inquiry of the term "uninsured automobile" relates to a
hit-and-run automobile. The hit-and-run automobile is defined in the
Countrywide Endorsement as:
an automobile which causes bodily injury to an insured arising
out of physical contact of such automobile with the insured or
with an automobile which the insured is occupying at the time
of the accident, provided:
(a) there cannot be ascertained the identity of either the
operator or the owner of such "hit and run" automobile;
(b) the insured or someone on his behalf shall have reported
the accident within 24 hours to a police, peace or judicial officer
or to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, and shall have filed
with the company within 30 days thereafter a statement under
oath that the insured or his legal representative has a cause of
action .... 77
To understand the Countrywide Endorsement three requirements
must be considered: the requirement of contact, of lack of identity, and
of timely notice.
The Contact Requirement
The basic reason for the contact requirement is the prevention of
fraudulent claims. It is easy to conceive of a situation in which a
driver, through his own negligence, has lost control of his vehicle and
driven off the highway. His contention could be that he was run off
the highway by some unknown or "mystery" vehicle. To preclude such
a claim the insurance companies have written the physical contact
requirement into the policies. Some states have passed statutes which
specifically require contact as a prerequisite to recovery.7 s Under the
contact requirement the question is whether direct contact or only
indirect contact is necessary. In New York, under the statutory require-
ment of physical contact,7 9 earlier cases 0 construed the requirement
strictly and held that direct contact was required. The requirement
771963 Countrywide Endorsement (c) (2). In Lenngren v. Traveler's Indem.
Co., 26 Misc. 2d 1084, 203 N.Y.S.2d 136 (1960), a policy did not contain the
hit-and-run provision. The reasoning was based on the fact that it could
not be determined whether or not there was a policy applicable at the time
of the accident.
78 CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (Supp. 1968); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-407.1 (Supp.
1967); MIcH. INS. CODE § 3010 (1968); Miss. CoDE ANN. § 8285-51 (Supp.
1966); N.Y. INS. LAws §§ 600-626 (Supp. 1968) ; S.C. CODE § 46-750.33 (1967).
79 N.Y. INS. LAWS §§ 600-626.80 Tuzzino v. MVAIC, 22 App. Div. 2d 641, 252 N.Y.S.2d 961, appeal dinnissed,




brought a harsh result in Petition of Portman.81 In that case a blind
woman was struck by an insured automobile and then struck again
by the insured automobile when it was struck by a hit-and-run automo-
bile. The New York court denied recovery to her for the second impact
because there was no physical contact between her and the hit-and-run
automobile. This case was overruled in MVVAIC v. Eisenberg8 2 when
the court held that indirect contact was sufficient.
Indirect contact occurs when A (hit-and-run automobile) strikes
B who then strikes C (insured). Thus, under a statutory requirement
of physical contact, California has held that even though physical
contact requirement was desigried to eliminate those claims which were
fictitious or fraudulent, it was not designed to lessen coverage.8 3 The
court compared this situation to the contact requirements in the com-
mon-law distinctions between trespass and trespass on the case. In
trespass, a direct contact was required, but in trespass on the case,
indirect contact was sufficient. Therefore, the striking of B by A
causing B to strike C was a sufficient contact to allow recovery. The
court also stated that physical contact should not be required in cases
where fraud does not exist. In Page v. Insurance Co. of North Amer-
ica,84 however, the court denied recovery to a person who was struck
by a vehicle which had swerved in order to avoid being struck by a
third vehicle, holding that there was not even "indirect contact." The
court noted that if the Legislature had intended that bodily injury
need only result from physical contact proximately caused by a hit-and-
run driver rather than direct contact with a hit-and-run driver it would
have so provided.
8 5
In states which do not have a statutory requirement of physical
contact, courts have generally held that either direct or indirect contact
is necessary.8 6 For example, in Amidzich v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co.,
8 7
the court held that the words "physical contact" require that there be at
least a minimal touching between two automobiles.
In Florida an interesting situation arises under the statutory defi-
nition of hit-and-run vehicles.88 The statute does not require physical
8133 Misc. 2d 385, 225 N.Y.S.2d 560 (1962).
82 18 N.Y.2d 1, 218 N.E.2d 524, 271 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1962).83 1nter-Insurance Exchange of Auto Club v. Lopez, 238 Cal. App. 2d 441, 47
Cal. Rptr. 834 (1965) ; Esparza v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., - Cal. App.
84 65 Cal. Rptr. 245 (1960).84256 Cal. App. 2d 374, 64 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1960).
85 See Coker v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 161 S.E.2d 175 (S.C. 1968).
86 State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Spinola, 375 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1967) ; Lawrence
v. Beneficial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 8 Ariz. App. 155, 444 P.2d 446 (1968);
Frager v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 155 Conn. 270, 231 A.2d 531 (1967);
Prosk v. Allstate Ins. Co., 83 Ill. App. 2d 457 (1967); Roloff v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 191 So. 2d 901 (La. App. 1966) ; Johnson v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 70 Wash. 2d 587, 424 P.2d 648 (1967) ; Hendricks v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co., 5 N.C. App. 197, 167 S.E.2d 876 (1969).
8744 Wis. 2d 45, 170 N.W.2d 813 (1969).
8 8 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.0851 (Supp. 1968).
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contact but does require that the identity of the driver be known. Thus,
in a situation in which there was no physical contact but the identity of
the driver was unknown,89 the court said that:
(The Company) . . . having enlarged the definition of unin-
sured motorist the company had the legal right to limit the en-
largement to cases in which there was physical contact. In other
words what the policy gives, the policy may take away, but
what the statute gives the policy may not take away.90
Therefore, in cases where there is direct contact or indirect contact,
i.e., when the hit-and-run driver strikes some object which in turn
strikes the claimant, recovery will be allowed. But what about the
situation in which the injured driver through his skill in operating a
motor vehicle avoids a collision with a hit-and-run driver, and in so
doing is injured. This is definitely a case where there may be some
fraudulent claims, but it would appear justifiable to allow recovery when
there is sufficient corroboration from impartial witnesses.91 It should be
noted that the State of Virginia does not require any physical contact
nor does it require corroboration of the claimant's testimony.92
The Identity Problem
The second requirement of the hit-and-run provision is that the
identity of the operator or owner of such a highway vehicle be unascer-
tainable. The identity question has not been given as strict an interpre-
tation as the physical contact requirement. For example, in Mangus v.
Doe,93 the insured was hit in the rear by a vehicle operated by an un-
known. The insured could have ascertained the identity of the driver
but failed to do so because he did not think he was injured. Four
months later, he learned that he had a ruptured disc and then filed a
report with the Division of Motor Vehicles. The trial court dismissed
89Raspall v. Beneficial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 226 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1969). It is
possible in Florida to collect under both situations of hit and run, i.e., if
there is not any physical contact but the driver is known and if there is
physical contact but the driver is unknown. See also, Progressive Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Brown, 229 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 1969).
9DId. at 467.
91 Esparza v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 257 Cal. App. 2d 496, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 245 (1968). The court held that a claimant was entitled to arbitration
in an instance where it appeared from the pleadings that there was no physical
contact. See Chadwick and Peche, California's Uninsured Motorist Statute
Scope and Problems, 13 HASINGs L. J. 194, 198 (1961) and Aksen, Arbitration
of Uninsured Motorist Endorsement Clahns, 24 OHmo ST. L. J. 589, 602 (1963).
92 VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-381 (1969). See Doe v. Brown, 203 Va. 508, 125 S.E.2d
159 (1962); Doe v. Faulkner, 203 Va. 522, 125 S.E2d 169 (1962); Doe v.
Simmers, 207 Va. 956, 154 S.E.2d 146 (1967). In Doe v. Brown the court said:
(T)he uninsured motorist statute is silent on the requirement of contact be-
tween the "John Doe automobile" and the "insured automobile. . . ." Here
again this is not a suit against the insurance company, which is not a de-
fendant, in this proceeding, to recover on the endorsement. The right of the
plaintiff to bring this action to establish legal liability on the uninsured motor-
ist and to recover damages is not given by the endorsement but by the statute.
... 154 S.E.2d at 165.
93 203 Va. 518, 125 S.E.2d 169 (1962).
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the action because the tortfeasor was not an unknown within the
meaning of the statutory definition. The Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals reversed. The court refused to interpret the statute as requiring
due diligence to ascertain the identity of the offending driver, especially
when it appeared that no injury had occurred. The court, commenting
on the possibility of fraudulent claims, said that:
.... (P)ersons who have valid causes of action should not be
denied the right to recover because of the possibility of the pre-
sentation of fraudulent claims by others. If fraudulent actions
do arise they may be ferreted out in the same manner in which
courts and juries handle such situations in other cases.9 4
In a New York case,9 5 with facts similar to those in Mangsts, ex-
cept that the accident was reported within twenty-four hours, recovery
was allowed. The court felt that the reporting of the accident within
twenty-four hours minimized the possibility of fraud. In another case9 6
a driver struck an infant-plaintiff. The driver gave the infant's mother
his name, address, and telephone number, but these were later found
to be false. The court held that all the requirements for a hit-and-run
vehicle had been met. The fact that the infant's mother did not take
sufficient precautions in obtaining the identity of the driver was held
not to bar the injured infant from recovery.9 7
Walsh v. State Farm Auto Mut. Ins. Co.98 presents another situa-
tion where the insured was unable to identify the driver. In Walsh
identity could not be ascertained because of the irate and provocative
behavior of the driver. The insured, a woman, was afraid to get out
of her automobile and confront the driver. The court held that the
definition in the policy was not limited to the driver who flees the
scene of the accident but also to those situations in which the insured
might reasonably fear for her own safety.
The burden of proving inability to identify the driver is always on
the party seeking to recover. Not only must the driver's identity be
unascertainable but also that of the owner. If the owner is identified
and the car was being driven without his permission, there would be
no coverage under the hit-and-run provision of the uninsured motorist
endorsement. However, recovery would be allowed under the clause
... no liability insurance.... applicable at the time of the accident."
From the cases discussed it can readily be seen that the courts
94125 S.E.2d at 168.
95 Riemenschneider v. MVAIC, 20 N.Y.2d 54, 232 N.E.2d 630, 285 N.Y.S.2d 593
(1967).
96 Darby v. MVAIC, 52 Misc. 2d 1045, 277 N.Y.S.2d 302 aff'd 30 App. Div. 2d 936,
293 N.Y.S.2d 988 ( ).
7 See also McKay v. MVAIC, 56 Misc. 2d 777, 290 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1968) ; Peti-
tion of Casanova, 36 Misc. 2d 489, 232 N.Y.S.2d 713 (1962). In both in
stances the inadvertance of the police officer in obtaining the identity of the
driver was sufficient to make the driver a hit-and-run driver under the statutes.
9890 Ill. App. 2d 156, 234 N.E.2d 394 (1968).
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have broadened the definition of a hit-and-run driver as commonly
understood by the layman . Even though the driver does not flee the
scene of the accident he may still be determined by the courts to be a
hit-and-run driver, if his identity is unascertainable for some other
justifiable reason. In cases in which the injuries do not manifest them-
selves until later there is a possibility of fraudulent claims but, as the
Virginia court said in Mangus., the courts and juries may be able to
ferret out the fraudulent claims just as they do in other casesP 9
The Notice Requirement
The notice requirement has two elements. The first is that the
accident shall be reported within twenty-four hours to the police, peace
officer or judicial officer or to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.
Second, the compatly shall receive notice of the accident within thirty
days. Both of these elements were inserted so as to prevent fraudulent
claims, and generally courts have upheld these provisions for that rea-
son. The requirement of notice within thirty days to the insurance
company is necessary to give the insurer the opportunity to investigate
the accident and determine the validity of the claim.
The New York courts represent the strict application of these con-
ditions precedent to recovery. In Bonavisa v. MVAIC 00 the insured
failed to report the accident for three days and it was held that he
had not met the necessary prerequisites to recovery. The court said:
It is a common and usual course of conduct to report to the
police station incidents of the character which would give rise
to a cause of action under the provisions of this statutory section.
Almost invariably a crime is involved, and a crime which out-
rages at least the person injured. Also, it is universally appreci-
ated that, failing a prompt report, apprehension or identification
of the malefactor is difficult to the point of virtual impossibility.
• . . (A) statute such as this, providing for recovery against a
defendant who has no means of contesting facts, should provide
reasonable precautions against fraud. To prevent an application
of fraudulent character, it is reasonable to insist that the party
should give a good and solid explanation of why he did not do
what people in the same situation commonly do.' 0'
The New York courts have also held that failure to notify insurer
of the accident for four months constituted grounds for denying cover-
age under the uninsured motorist provision, notwithstanding the fact
that the claimant was in the hospital and under the impression that an
attorney was working on the case. 02 In that case the fact that the in-
surer was on notice of the accident because another claimant had filed
a claim was held not to make any difference.
99 Supra note 94.10021 Misc. 2d 963, 198 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1960). See also Ithier v. MVAIC,, 31
App. Div. 2d 616, 295 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1968).101 Id. at 964, 198 N.Y.S.2d at 233-34.
102 Lloyd v. MVAIC, 23 N.Y.2d 297, 297 N.Y.S.2d 563 (1969).
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The rationale for the decisions in New York may be the fact that
the time limitations and other conditions precedent are statutorily
delineated.10 3 H-owever, the use of a statutory rule may also work to
the detriment of the insurer. In Natuonzide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sours1 0 4
the statute 'I" did not provide for the thirty-day notice requirement to
the insurer. The court held that since it was not required by statute
the policy could not require it and therefore such a provision was in-
valid. Recovery may also be allowed unless the insurer can show it
was prejudiced because of the non-compliance with the statute.0 6
In states that do not have statutes delineating notice requirements,
the policy becomes the determinative factor. When the policy is the
main consideration the insurer must always contend with the possibility
that the court will find an ambiguity in the policy. If the court finds
an ambiguity, it will apply a rule of construction most favorable to the
insured.
LESLIE J. MLAKAR
103 N.Y. INs. CODE § 608(b) (1966).
104205 Va. 602, 139 S.E.2d 51 (1964).
105 VA. CoDr ANN. § 38.1-381 (Supp. 1966) and § 46.1-400 (Supp. 1966).
106 See also, Hanover v. Carroll, 50 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1966), where the insured
was entitled to coverage despite the failure to file within 30 days but did
report the accident within twenty-four hours, and the insured failed to show
prejudice. Accord: Utica __Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,































































































































































a. Insured may purchase Uninsured Motorist limits up to the limits of bodily
injury coverage afforded by the policy.
b. The insurer must agree to forgo any rights to execute upon the property of
any party who is the insured of the insolvent insurer, provided that such party
shall assign all rights against such insolvent insurer as an insured under a lia-
bility policy.
c. In the event of a payment by the uninsured motorist insurer because of the in-
solvency of the tortfeasor insurer, the uninsured motorists insurer's right to
recovery or reimbursement shall not include any rights against the tortfeasor
but it shall proceed directly against the insolvent insurer or its receiver,
d. In the event of a payment by the Uninsured Motorist insurer because of in-
solvency of the tortfeasor's insurer the uninsured motorist insurer is not entitled
to any right of recovery against such tortfeasor in excess of the proceeds re-
covered from the assets of the insolvent insurer.
e. Larger amounts may be offered and purchased if desired.
f. Insured may purchase additional uninsured motorist coverage up to the limits of
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